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Prologue 
 
 Medieval literary studies hold a privileged position in methodological 
and theoretical argumentation. The privilege is based on the limitedness of 
and the in-immediate access to their “material.”  The latter is created by the 
philological barrier that virtually keeps theoretical and/or methodological 
intruders out. In that sense medieval literary studies potentially enjoy a 
sanctuary privilege: theoretical and methodological novelties may enter the 
sanctuary only if the philologically trained so warrant. That is, literary 
medievalists are very much in control of theoretical and/or methodological 
import because, due to their philological training, they are the only ones who 
can handle the “material” in the first place.1  
 Due to the limitedness of their material, medieval literary studies do, 
however, have another kind of privilege. The concept of some monolithic 
entity called “the Middle Ages” creates a kind of laboratory situation where 
new approaches/methods/theories can furnish quick results. Since the 
Middle Ages—or any period within it, or any ensemble of phenomena from 
remote periods that are made the object of research—are constructs in the 
mind of the scholarly beholder to begin with, the (sometimes sparse) 
building blocks, as it were, out of which the respective constructs are built, 
can more easily be shuffled about according to one’s (methodologically 
                                                           
1 I am excluding here the possibility of gaining access to medieval texts through 
modern renderings and am thus arguing within the vein of the “Old Philology.” 
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geared) Erkenntnisinteresse.2 
 When speaking about methodology, there is yet another point that I 
think necessary to bring to mind. This is the particular medievalist “insider 
feeling” of philologically common ground that so temptingly facilitates 
(international, and in particular transatlantic) scholarly exchange—or 
dismissal—of methodologies and/or theories in (medieval) literary studies. 
This common assumption can lead to a potentially deceptive disregard of 
what otherwise is—or should be—so much in the medievalists’ (as in 
anybody else’s) mind: the matter of historically developed differences. This 
may appear to be such a hermeneutic triviality that most of us probably shun 
away from admitting it to begin with. Nevertheless, it is necessary to put the 
fiction of the universal academic community in its proper place in order to 
adequately appreciate what “the (contemporary) other” has to say.3 
 The great honor of being invited to give the 1991 presentation that, in 
memoriam of the late Albert Lord has been renamed into the Albert Lord 
and Milman Parry Lecture, has given me the opportunity to formulate my 
own methodological position in a distinguished forum. The lively discussion 
that followed the lecture has motivated me to go into more detail about the 
theoretical basis of this position for the printed version of my original 
lecture. In this way my present essay is meant to bear witness to the fact that 
“face-to-face” exchange, the oral-aural encounter, is still most fruitful for 
our scholarly endeavors.4 
 
 
Methodologies 
 
 Methodological discussion in literary studies of the Middle Ages has 
                                                           
2 This is a notion from methodological discussion in Germany for which I cannot 
find an English equivalent.  Analogously to the English translation of Habermas’ title 
Erkenntnis und Interesse of 1968 into Knowledge and Human Interests, one may perhaps 
render it as knowledge interest, although I do not find this completely satisfactory, as the 
German Erkenntnis carries a more procedural note.  Thus cognitive interest may be more 
to the point, if cognitive is not understood as a psychological term.  Cf. below, note 28. 
 
3 I am very much indebted to Adam B. Davis, who spent the 1991-92 academic 
year in Freiburg as a Humboldt scholar, for many fruitful discussions à propos 
“transatlantic differences” in scholarly research. 
 
4 For various shared tours d’horizon(s) I owe my kindest thanks to the host of this 
lecture. 
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recently been revived under the headings of “New Philology” and “New 
Historicism.”5  What I am subsequently outlining has not yet received such a 
handy tag, and it should be regarded neither as a substitute nor as a rival to 
“New Philology” or “New Historicism.”  On the contrary, it must rely on the 
methods of Philology—old and new—and it also is indebted to Historicism 
in respecting the historicity both of the subject and object of understanding 
and thus also of the analyzer and the analyzed. Moreover, I want to 
thematize the historicity of the theory itself: its orginal shaping, its 
development, and the recent complementation that has given the method a 
new forceful momentum. 
 The theory under discussion is what has become known as “Reception 
Theory,” and the recent complementation may provisionally be termed “the 
Orality/Literacy Question.” The reasons why I am insisting on 
maintaining—for the time being—the possibly disconcerting word question 
in the notion are as follows.  What the last thirty or so years of research into 
orality and literacy from various angles have brought to light are not simply 
“facts” that one adds to the material under investigation—such as one would 
do with, for example, a second manuscript of Beowulf that shows no traces 
of Christian ideas whatsoever. The consequences of research into 
orality/literacy go rather to the methodological heart of the medievalists’ 
matter, as the insights and findings gained from this research necessitate the 
thematizing of heuristic and hermeneutic agreements, agreements that up to 
now have been not only tacit but largely pre-conscious. As such, the 
realization of the Orality/Literacy Question comes close to the effects of a 
discovery in natural sciences. Thus I am contending that with the integration 
of the Orality/Literacy Question (of both its “factual findings” and its 
heuristic consequences) reception-oriented medieval literary studies are 
“able to account for a wider range of...phenomena or to account with greater 
precision for some of those previously known” (Kuhn 1962:66).  This is no 
less than postulating that with this integration a specific line of medieval 
literary studies has undergone a paradigmatic change.  
 Of course my use of the term paradigmatic change is indicative of the 
source for the quote I have just given: Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions.  The appropriation of Kuhn’s observations on 
“scientific revolutions” for the humanities is obviously not very original. In 
1969, for instance, Hans Robert Jauss published his article 
“Paradigmawechsel in der Literaturwissenschaft,” in which he accounted for 
                                                           
5 For a discussion of “New Philology” from various aspects, see vol. 65.1 of 
Speculum 1990; the outstanding representative of “New Historicism” in medieval studies 
is Lee Patterson (1987, 1991).  
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the history and the contemporary state of literary studies under aspects 
suggested in Kuhn’s book: paradigmatic changes occur when another 
paradigm has finally proven insufficient for the explanation of given 
phenomena.  Jauss sees the causes for paradigmatic changes in literary 
studies in a realization that an established approach is no longer able “to 
wrench works of art from their state of being past through permanently new 
interpretation, to translate them into a new present” (“Werke der Kunst 
durch immer neue Interpretation dem Vergangensein zu entreissen, sie in 
eine neue Gegenwart zu übersetzen;” 55).  Here Jauss is also dealing with 
the question of whether it is legitimate to transfer observations made in the 
history of the sciences (Naturwissenschaften) to the humanities (Literatur- 
oder Geisteswissenschaften).6  In the humanities, and particularly in literary 
studies, Jauss argues, paradigmatic changes are not caused by anomalies 
because in the humanities there is “no area of empirically verifiable 
observations comparable to that of the (natural) sciences” (“kein der 
Naturwissenschaft vergleichbares Feld empirisch verifizierbarer 
Beobachtungen;” 54). However, as we will see later, “anomalies” may be of 
                                                           
6 Here as in other places in this article I am facing the difficulty of translating the 
German Wissenschaft.  Recently it has been translated by science even in compounds 
such as Literaturwissenschaft.  It may have been under the influence of the texts he has 
been translating that Timothy Bahti (in the “Translator’s Preface” to the 1982 translation 
of a collection of articles by Hans Robert Jauss), for example, is speaking (in his own 
text) of the human sciences, obviously referring to “the humanities.”  On the other hand, 
the term Literaturwissenschaft in the title of Jauss’ Literaturgeschichte als Provokation 
der Literaturwissenschaft is turned by Bahti into Literary Theory, the phrase der 
literaturwissenschaftlichen Methoden (e.g., Jauss 1967:7) into of the literary critical 
methods (Jauss [Bahti] 1982a:4).  In trying to find some terminological consistency I will 
use the “original” English terms—such as humanities (= Germ. Geisteswissenschaften) or 
literary studies (= Germ. Literaturwissenschaft).  When giving my own renderings of 
German quotations into English I will use science/scientific when it seems appropriate to 
reflect a specific methodological and/or theoretical claim.  For a discussion of this 
problem in view of the translation of Gadamer, cf. “Translators’ Preface” to Truth and 
Method (1989:xviii).  The fact that in German the term Wissenschaft is extended to the 
humanities points, of course, to a concept of such studies that is quite different from that 
in the English-speaking countries.  I suppose that this terminological difference is also a 
symptom of the “alterity” question with regard to the mutual reception and translation (in 
the broad sense of the word) of theories in (and to) the States and Europe respectively.  In 
his recent article “Auszug der Wissenschaften aus dem Deutschen” (1991:espec. 587-91), 
Hans-Martin Gauger deals with these terminological differences between English and 
German in the context of the observation that the German language is constantly and 
increasingly withdrawn from scholarly/scientific publication.  For a discussion of the 
applicability of Kuhn to linguistics, see Oesterreicher 1977. 
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relevance for literary studies as well, since the “discovery” I have in mind 
has very much to do with anomalies and how to account for them. 
 Now, the name with which I have preliminarily dubbed this 
“discovery”—the Orality/Literacy Question—is admittedly quite vague.  Yet 
up to now there is no more precise notion to refer to the growing awareness 
in fields such as linguistics, anthropology, psychology, history, and literary 
studies that orality and literacy are phylogenetic conditions as well as 
conditions of cultural communities. What we have become increasingly 
aware of is the fact that orality and literacy do, on the surface, pertain to the 
absence or presence of the “technology of writing” as a communicative 
medium for an individual and/or within a community, yet that, on a deeper 
level, this absence or presence accounts for very different setups of 
cognition and conceptualization.7 These different setups are intricately 
interrelated with different modes of abstraction, different concepts of 
language, different concepts of “tradition,” different concepts of history and 
so forth. 
 If we look more closely into the research that has brought about the 
realization of the Orality/Literacy Question, and if we look at its connection 
to medieval studies, we very soon see why Kuhn’s observations with regard 
to scientific discoveries apply here (1962:55-56): 
 
discovering a new sort of phenomenon is necessarily a complex event, one 
which involves recognizing both that something is and what it is. . . . if 
both observation and conceptualization, fact and assimilation to theory, are 
inseparably linked in discovery, then discovery is a process and must take 
time. Only when all the relevant conceptual categories are prepared in 
advance, in which case the phenomenon would not be of a new sort, can 
discovering that and discovering what occur effortlessly, together and in 
an instant.  
 
As to literary studies, those “conceptual categories” for the realization of the 
Orality/Literacy Question have most certainly not been “prepared in 
advance,” because what has basically been discovered is the conditioning of 
those categories themselves. In other words, the awareness of the 
Orality/Literacy Question involves the awareness of being oneself part of the 
question. The consequent self-reflection and critical introspection 
necessitated by the Orality/Literacy Question seems to carry such a 
forbidding potential that it evidently sometimes blocks the acceptance of the 
                                                           
7 For a comprehensive view of these implications, cf. espec. Ong 1982 and 1986, 
Havelock 1986, Goody and Watt 1962-63. 
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question in advance. 
 In various places Walter Ong has criticized the fact that orality has 
mostly been seen and defined from the point of view of literacy, a process 
that views orality as a deficiency (1986:23): 
 
The term “illiterate” itself suggests that persons belonging to the class it 
designates are deviants, defined by something they lack, namely literacy. . 
. . [The] views of writing as a mechanical skill obligatory for all human 
beings distort our understanding of what is human if only because they 
block understanding what natural mental processes are before writing 
takes possession of consciousness.  
 
It appears to me that this taint of deficiency has led some medievalists either 
to ignore the question entirely or to just briefly look into it and then put it 
aside as not pertinent to the Middle Ages after all. If we have manuscripts 
from this period, so their defensive argument runs, if we know that people 
(at least those in some way or other “relevant” for us because they have 
provided us with written records of their time) could read (and write), then 
why bother? 
 To counter this preconception, one has to put forward the argument 
that after taking note of the findings furnished by the research into orality 
and literacy as briefly indicated earlier, those scholars who are willing to 
check the conditioning of their own heuristics will consider it an 
epistemological neglect—if not fraud—if the pertinence of those findings for 
the Middle Ages be denied. To be sure, for medieval studies there has 
always been a kind of implicit understanding that this period was not that 
all-pervasively literate after all.8 Or, at least, that there was some kind of 
peaceful coexistence of litterati and illitterati.9 Once aware of the 
Orality/Literacy Question and this heuristic opposition (which until recently 
resulted in a concentration on the litterati), the medievalist may develop a 
sensitivity  for the “oral mind” very much present also in the litterati.10  
From the historical perspective, the litterati vs. illitterati opposition 
translates into accounting for such a “coexistence” as symptoms of 
transition, conceiving of the Middle Ages, particularly in relation to the 
                                                           
8 Cf. Grundmann 1958. 
 
9 For a critical discussion of Grundmann, cf. also Green 1990:275-76. 
 
10 The notions of the “oral mind” and the “literate mind” have been created by 
Havelock (e.g., 1986). 
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Germanic cultures, as a transitional period underway from (primary) orality, 
before their Christianization, to (almost fully developed) literacy in the 
Renaissance. 
 Now, the view of the Middle Ages as a “transitional” culture is 
controversial, since it potentially implies denying this period a position in its 
own right.11  Nevertheless, I suggest that as long as we bear in mind our own 
perspective, the notion of transitionality should not be dismissed completely. 
It can still provide a heuristics that causes us to reconsider one of the most 
cherished—and perhaps most abused—concepts with regard to the Middle 
Ages: that of medieval alterity. Later I want to take up this notion once again 
and try to place it within the methodological discussion of medieval literary 
studies.  Since Hans Robert Jauss, one of the founders of Reception Theory, 
has made this notion the center of his methodological discussion of medieval 
literary studies, it will be necessary to review some historical implications of 
Reception Theory against the background of recent methodological 
discussions in the United States. This will bring to light another kind of 
“alterity,” namely that of American and European (more precisely German) 
medieval literary studies and their methodologies as historical and/or 
political idiosyncrasies. 
 
 
The Historicity of Reception Theory 
 
 Let us look now at how American “New Historicism” as represented 
by the work of Lee Patterson deals with Jauss’ concept.  In his recent 
publications Patterson rides a forceful attack against all kinds of well 
established approaches to medieval literature, most of all against 
“historicism in its positivist phase,” which harbored the belief that “natural 
science was successful because its methodology partook of the certainty and 
universality of the natural laws it sought to uncover” and hence “assumed 
for itself a similar methodological purity” (1987:15). This kind of criticism 
has obviously been valid  until well into the second half of our century.  
Thus in the foreword to the second edition of Wahrheit und Methode Hans-
Georg Gadamer characterized “the methodology of modern historical 
sciences” [der modernen historischen Wissenschaften] as “making what has 
grown historically and has been transmitted historically an object to be 
                                                           
11 I am indebted to the historian Hans-Werner Goetz (Hamburg) for pointing out 
to me in a private communication that my “evolutionary perspective” (as advanced in 
Schaefer 1992 for the earlier English Middle Ages) “may bar the view of the autonomy 
of the era where the ‘oral’ and the ‘literate’ were also intimately interrelated.” 
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established like an experimental finding—as if tradition were as alien, and 
from the human point of view as unintelligible, as an object of physics” 
(1989:xxxiii-iv).12 
 Another refutation Patterson produces, although it appears only in a 
footnote (1987:7-8, n.8), is that of the receptionalist approach as formulated 
by Hans Robert Jauss.  For reasons I find hard to follow, Patterson, on the 
one hand, credits Jauss with being the “obvious exception” to the rule (stated 
in the main text) “that the issue of historical understanding per se has 
received virtually no general discussion within the context of medieval 
Studies” (7).  On the other hand, he accuses Jauss of declining “to confront 
the historicity of the observer” (8, n.9 from previous page).  Whenever a 
scholar takes up the concept of “horizon” as spelled out in Gadamer’s 
Wahrheit und Methode, he cannot possibly do so and, at the same time, be 
oblivious to the observer’s historical situatedness (how else could he want to 
aspire to the “fusion of the past horizon...with the present one”? [Jauss 
1979:183]). 
 I wonder whether Patterson’s judgment has to do with another 
observation he makes in this context (8): 
 
The inhospitality of Anglo-American literary culture as a whole to a 
philosophically informed historicism has largely condemned historical 
criticism to the benighted positivism of the nineteenth century, a darkness 
that is only now gradually yielding before the arrival of phenomenological 
hermeneutics, Marxism, and other European imports. 
 
Obviously the methodological discussions within the humanities have 
followed very different paths on either side of the Atlantic. First and 
foremost, if we view things from the present situation, the “revolutionary 
years” of 1968-69 have forever shaken the positivistic complacency of the 
humanities in all West German universities. The debate about “political 
correctness” that pervades the American academy these days reminds me 
very much of the methodological—and hence, ideological—screening any 
                                                           
12 In particular with Gadamer it is sometimes instructive to savor the original 
(1972:xxi):  “. . . wo die Methodik der modernen historischen Wissenschaften Platz 
gegriffen hat und das geschichtlich Gewordene, geschichtlich Überlieferte zum ‘Objekt’ 
macht, das es ‘festzustellen’ gilt wie einen experimentellen Befund—als wäre 
Überlieferung in dem selben Sinne fremd und, menschlich gesehen, unverständlich wie 
der Gegenstand der Physik (1972:xxi).  I use the second edition of the English translation 
of Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald 
G. Marshall, which appeared in 1989.  The German quotes are taken from the third 
revised edition of 1972. 
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professor in those days had to face from the students.13  This screening 
checked richtiges Bewusstsein—something that had to be a kritisches 
Bewusstsein. Of course this was a highly political and politicized discussion, 
the language of which was charged with belligerent terminology.14 
 I am by no means claiming that each and every professor of German 
or English or History in those days suddenly and irrevocably turned into a 
scholar with a kritisches Bewusstsein in the sense the Revolution prescribed. 
However, we had our extensive share of agitation with the ubiquitous and 
persistently reformulated question of “relevance.”15  The reason I am making 
this historical remark is simply to point out that an accusation against Jauss 
or any other representative of the Konstanz School for declining to “confront 
the historicity of the observer” must be dismissed, if only for those 
contextual (historical) reasons!  And there is yet another aspect that needs to 
be thematized with regard to Reception Theory, an aspect that is 
indispensable for the appropriate assessment of this theory (or method, or 
approach) within the methodological discussion that is currently going on in 
North America.  
                                                           
13 It may be the European recollection and/or witnessing of totalitarian systems 
that gives such a disturbing ring to the commitment to “correctness.” 
 
14 To give a faint impression of what the discussion sounded like in West 
Germany, cf. the following statement:  “Was ist die heutige Verfassung dieser 
Wissenschaft [i.e., der Germanistik]?  Im Polizeistaat Adenauers verriet sie das 
Geschäftsgeheimnis ihrer Existenz:  Opportunismus. . . .  [Die] Studentenrevolte [hat] die 
schmutzige Verfilzung dieser Wissenschaft mit dem Faschismus angeprangert, ihre 
Geschichtsfeindlichkeit unter der Parole ‘Die Germanistik lehrt das Interesse an der 
Literatur als Desinteresse an der Gesellschaft’ bekämpft. . . .  Die Stosskraft dieses 
Kampfes gegen die bürgerliche Germanistik resultierte aus den antiimperialistischen 
Kämpfen der Studentenrevolte” (Autorenkollektiv 1971:1; “What is the present state of 
this science [Wissenschaft, i.e. Germanistics]?  During Adenauer’s police state it gave 
away the trade secret of its existence:  opportunism. . . .  [The] students’ revolt has 
pilloried the dirty intertwining of this field and fascism, fought against enmity towards 
history with the slogan ‘Germanistik teaches interest in literature by way of disinterest in 
society.’  The impact of this battle against bourgeois Germanistik was a result of the anti-
imperialistic battles of the students’ revolt”). 
 
15 For a splendid contemporary discussion of the “crisis of the university” and its 
consequences, see Hartmut von Hentig, Magier oder Magister.  Über die Einheit der 
Wissenschaft im Verständigungsprozess (1972). 
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 Reception Theory is deeply indebted to phenomenology.16 Without 
taking into account this philosophical background, Jauss’ claim that, among 
other factors, an historical “horizon of expectation” may also be 
reconstructed through the “opposition between fiction and reality, between 
the poetic and the practical function of language” (1982a:24) may cause 
misunderstandings. Thus, Patterson has to advance substantial criticism: 
what Jauss’ “theory amounts to,” he summarizes, “is traditional literary 
history...supplemented with a comparison of the work to ‘reality,’ a reality 
whose constitution Jauss does not specify” (1987:8, n. 9).17 Nowhere does 
Jauss demand that one compare the work to “reality (as such).” The term 
“reality” is used and relativized in the appositional dichotomy of “fiction and 
reality” (Fiktion und Realität) and “the poetic and the practical function of 
language” (poetischer und praktischer Funktion der Sprache) 
(1982a:24/1967:35).  Yet I suppose that from the post-structuralist, 
decontructivist stance these distinctions are void anyway. But Patterson 
draws his notion of “reality”—and thus his footnote criticism of Jauss—
from yet another concept:  “If social reality is inherently and inescapably 
theatrical, then the distinction between the real and the fictive (lege history 
and text) need not be sustained” (1987:61). True enough, yet it should also 
be noted that the constructedness of social reality is by no means a recent 
discovery.18  Yet I doubt whether this insight also by necessity erases the 
distinction between “reality” and “fiction.”  
 Jauss’ objective is not, in this context, to say of what “reality” exactly 
consists.  His point is the difference between how language is used in 
literature or poetry as opposed to its function outside, thus obviously using 
structuralist or formalist concepts of language and communication. Again, 
post-structuralism may put all of this in doubt. However, even if we agree 
with Derrida’s  dictum—I do not—that il n’y a pas de hors-texte we may 
also agree that within this all-pervading text words “do different things.” 
Thus, for instance, Wolfgang Iser sees the distinction between literary and 
non-literary fiction in fundamentally different manifestations of the 
                                                           
16 Cf., e.g., for Husserl’s notion of “horizon,” Gadamer 1989:245-49; the 
affiliation is well outlined in Jay 1982. 
 
17 Cf., in contrast to this position, Frantzen 1990:122-26. 
 
18 The phenomenologically oriented “Sociology of Knowledge” (first developed 
by Karl Mannheim) seems largely to have escaped the attention of the present type of 
literary criticism;  cf. Alfred Schütz’s Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (1932/74, 
for English versions, 1971/74); cf. also (in Schütz’s wake) Berger and Luckmann 1966.  
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respective narrative with regard to those who are exposed to these fictions 
(1985:215):  
 
... fiction plays a vital role in the activities of cognition and behaviour, as 
in the founding of institutions, societies and world-pictures. The difference 
between all these and the literary text is that the latter reveals its own 
fictionality. Because of this, its function must be radically different from 
that of other activities that mask their fictional nature. The masking, of 
course, need not necessarily occur with the intention to deceive; it occurs 
because the fiction is meant to provide an explanation or a foundation, and 
could not do so if its fictional nature were to be exposed. The concealment 
of its fictionality endows the explanation provided with the appearance of 
reality, which is vital because the fiction functions as the constitutive basis 
of this reality.  
 
Rainer Warning, another scholar from the Konstanz School (and Jauss’ 
student) retains, as it were, the metaphoric language of the theater that 
Patterson (independently) uses when he speaks of literary fiction as “staged 
discourse.”19 
 It certainly has to be conceded that in view of the nature of medieval 
literature the classification of a text as “fictional” is problematic to begin 
with.20  Yet I think there is common agreement that “conscious/intended/ 
known” fictionality in narrative literature had been reestablished in the high 
Middle Ages. And, what is particularly interesting for our present point: this 
(re-) establishing of fictional narrative was a “consequence of literacy,” as 
Franz H. Bäuml has sketched out from a phenomenological point of view in 
his seminal article on “Varieties and Consequences of Medieval Literacy 
and Illiteracy” (1980).21  I do not want to elaborate on the notion and 
concept of fiction any further here; the point Bäuml has so convincingly 
made, however, indicates the path on which Reception Theory and studies in 
orality/literacy are eventually bound to meet. Instead I want to follow 
further—from the European point of view—the path that has led to this 
point of convergence. For this I suggest taking a closer look at Jauss’ notion 
of the alterity of the Middle Ages. 
                                                           
19 Cf. Warning 1980; the notion of inszenierter Diskurs has subsequently been 
adopted by Iser (1982/85).  For a phenomenological assessment of fictionality, cf. also 
Hamburger 1968. 
 
20 Cf. Jauss 1982b. 
 
21 Cf. also Schaefer 1991. 
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 First of all, it is easily overlooked that Jauss actually uses this term in 
two very dissimilar senses.22  In the sense of “otherness” it has the most 
intensive impact for his theoretical deliberations. Therefore it may escape 
our attention that Jauss has explicitly said that he is using alterity also in the 
sense delineated by the Rumanian linguist Eugenio Coseriu who speaks of 
“the dimension of the alterity of language” (“Dimension der Alterität der 
Sprache”) as a universal, for “language is...always...directed toward 
somebody else” (“die Sprache ist...immer...auf einen anderen ausgerichtet;”  
1971:187-88).  In this sense a work of medieval literature is for Jauss “an 
aesthetic object which, thanks to its linguistic form, is directed toward an 
other, understanding consciousness—and which therefore also allows for 
communication with a later, no longer contemporary addressee” 
(1979:187).23 Now, to insist on the communicative nature of (any) piece of 
literature is trivial unless specific methodological consequences are drawn 
from this statement. In other words, we should not only make the 
observation that literature is communicative, but go on asking how this 
communication works.  
 After the initiatory steps taken by Jauss and Iser in the late 1960’s and 
early 1970’s, Reception Theory quickly saw a further development with 
substantial qualifications in this very direction. Thus Hans Ulrich 
Gumbrecht in 1975 made a convincing effort to elaborate Receptional 
Aesthetics into what he calls “Literaturwissenschaft als 
Kommunikationssoziologie” (“literary science as a sociology of 
communication”).24  Relevant for our present issue is the fact that 
Gumbrecht wanted the “new literary studies” (as initiated by Jauss and Iser) 
                                                           
22 The two senses are, as a matter of fact, so vastly dissimilar that one may 
suspect Jauss of having somehow been trapped here in the fallacy of a homophony. 
 
23 The English translation of the article “Alterität und Modernität . . . ” reads 
(1979:187, boldface added):  “It is not by accident that this term [alterity] became the 
focus of interest in the debate over Paul Zumthor’s Essai de poétique médiévale.  Along 
with his usage, I follow Eugenio Coseriu’s theory. . . .”  In the German original this 
reads:  “Dieser Begriff ist nicht zufällig in der Debatte über Paul Zumthors Essai . . .  in 
den Mittelpunkt des Interesses getreten.  Ich Folge in seinem Gebrauch zugleich der 
Sprachtheorie Eugenio Coserius . . .” (1977:14).  The English version suggests that the 
term is taken over from Zumthor.  As my colleague Richard Matthews has pointed out to 
me, the reference in his usage is ambiguous (that is, it could also refer in advance to 
E.C.).  I would nevertheless suggest as a “more correct” translation: “Simultaneously I 
follow in its use [i.e., the use of the term alterity] the linguistic theory of E.C. . . .”  
 
24 Programmatically so in Gumbrecht 1975.   
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to be conceived of as a “Wissenschaft von den Bedingungen der 
Sinnbildung” (“science of the conditions of the constitution of meaning;” 
1975:397). This modification of the original Reception Theory is 
momentous.  As Gumbrecht specified earlier in this same article, literary 
studies—in this heuristic line—are no longer meant to seek the “evaluation 
of constitutions of meaning over a text as more or less ‘correct ones’” 
(“Bewertung der Sinnbildungen als mehr oder weniger ‘richtige’;” 390)—in 
other words, evaluation of an interpretation as correct or not.25  What 
Gumbrecht demands of this neue Literaturwissenschaft is that it strive for 
“the detection of the correlation between the conditions of constituting 
meaning over a text and the constitutions of meaning themselves” (“das 
Aufdecken des Zusammenhangs zwischen den Bedingungen von 
Sinnbildungen über Texten und diesen Sinnbildungen selbst;” ibid.). 
 Turning away from questions of “interpretative correctness” meant 
not only turning away from “text-immanent criticism” (= New Criticism).  It 
also meant giving a new bent to the kind of Receptional Aesthetics that had 
“blurred the difference between normative and descriptive history of 
reception.”26  Gumbrecht’s advancement of Reception Theory results in an 
(almost) final farewell to traditional philological studies (thriving 
discontentedly until the arrival of trained linguists in the various language 
departments during the 1960’s and well beyond). Moreover, it has integrated 
the “sociological” question—which was so forcefully (and sometimes 
violently) posed by the Marxist faction—with the methods of then modern 
linguistics, which started to receive the increasing attention of literary 
studies in the mid and late 1960’s.27 
 What Gumbrecht (and Stierle) so convincingly formulated in order to 
contribute  to  the  “discussion  about the ‘knowledge interests’ and methods  
                                                           
25 Cf. Patterson’s similar criticism of “interpretative correctness” (1987:45). 
 
26 Gumbrecht said this in view of Iser’s concept of the “implied reader,” which he 
sees as suffering from the fact “dass er [i.e. Iser] den Unterschied zwischen normativer 
und deskriptiver Rezeptionsgeschichte verwischt” (1975:391). 
 
27 It is worthwhile noting that—apart from the well-established departments of 
more or less traditional comparative linguistics (usually “Indogermanistik”)—linguistics 
in Germany has remained within the various “philologies” (that is, the “Language and 
Literature departments”).  This is true at least for the “traditional universities.”  Thus for 
German students of English, for instance, linguistics—usually including the history of the 
language—is an integral part of their curriculum. 
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of literary science” (“Erkenntnisinteressen und Methoden der 
Literaturwissenschaft;”28 Gumbrecht 1975:388) met with (more or less 
latent) disapproval within the community of students of the humanities in 
that period.29  In the meantime the Marxist challenge of the late sixties and 
early seventies has since long petered out,30 but the questions it raised so 
loudly and clearly have brought about an irreversible methodisches 
Bewusstsein, even if it was of no more avail than recognizing one’s own 
positivism (which miraculously has somehow managed to survive 
undercover). 
 In a way medieval studies was exempt from the hardest “blows” of 
the time. Nevertheless, for those scholars able and willing to look beyond 
the walls of their philological hortus conclusus the impetus of that 
methodological discussion has proven extremely fruitful. Thus it was a 
lucky coincidence—or was it really a coincidence?—that scholars like Hans 
Robert Jauss and Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht are solidly trained medievalists. 
 What I have said up to this point may suggest that, since the 1970’s, 
Receptional Aesthetics or Reception Theory has been the all-pervading 
“paradigm” of (German) literary studies in general and medieval literary 
studies in particular. A claim to this effect would thoroughly distort the 
overall picture. It is certainly fair to say that most literary scholars—among 
them also medievalists—took note of the works of Jauss, Iser, and their 
                                                           
28 For a brief discussion of the difficulties in translating the notion 
Erkenntnisinteresse, cf. note 2 above. 
 
29 This aspect is knowledgeably sketched at various points in Holub 1984. 
 
30 Obviously it is a “continental” misconception—perhaps only my own—to 
suppose that as the “Revolution of ’68/’69” took place on both sides of the Atlantic, the 
Marxist attack on literary studies and its academic institutions must have been as 
ubiquitous.  However, critical harassment such as the “Ideologieverdacht” seems to be 
quite recent in the United States (if we leave the “McCarthy era” aside), now fostered by 
confluences of Deconstruction and Marxist criticism; cf., for instance, Frantzen 
1990:112-13.  It is remarkable that the work of Erich Köhler—in part strongly influenced 
by (moderated) Marxist ideas—is obviously missing in the methodological discussion in 
the United States.  With his Ideal und Wirklichkeit Köhler produced perhaps the most 
convincing mediaeval study in the “sociology of literature” as early as 1956 (2nd ed. 
1970); for further moderating qualifications of the Marxist-oriented claims, cf. Köhler 
1974.  Literatursoziologie as developed by Köhler has obviously received very little 
attention in the U.S. in general.  Thus Holub (1984) does not mention Köhler in his 
section on “Literary Sociology” within the chapter “Influences and Precursors [of 
Reception Theory].”   For an application of Köhler’s approach to Chaucer, cf. Schaefer 
1977. 
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followers. Yet just as Reception Theory proved to be a very integrative 
approach, it also appears to have lent itself to a subsequent integration into 
the work of scholars who perceive their research as largely a-theoretical or, 
at least, not biased toward any particular theory. 
 As far as I am aware, medieval studies in North America have been, 
all in all, as much or as little theory-biased as in Germany. Nevertheless, 
whenever theories (such as Exegetics and New Criticism)31 intruded into 
medieval research in America, these theories have been more or less of an 
exclusive kind. This also holds for initial studies done in what has come to 
be called the Oral-Formulaic Theory, which, by the way, seems to be of so 
little interest to Patterson that he does not even bother to reject it.32 Yet there 
is one voice that has advocated a more comprehensive and integrative 
approach to medieval vernacular literature. The voice is that of Franz H. 
Bäuml. 
 
 
Reception Theory and the Orality/Literacy Question 
 
 In the postscript to a 1979 reprint of his article “Der Übergang 
mündlicher zur artes-bestimmten Literatur des Mittelalters,” which first 
appeared in 1968, Bäuml stated (247; italics added): 
 
Aufgrund genauerer Definition der Begriffe “mündlich” und “schriftlich” 
im jeweiligen Bezug auf Tradition, Komposition, Text oder Vortrag, 
Publikum oder Publikumsorientierung, soziale Funktion der dadurch 
gekennzeichneten Überlieferungstypen u.dgl., eröffnet sich die 
Möglichkeit, die Literatur des Mittelalters als Produkt einer auf 
Schriftlichkeit fussenden Kultur, getragen von einer überwiegend 
analphabethischen Bevölkerung, zu erfassen.  Sofern nun der Funktion der 
Literatur innerhalb dieser Kultur und der ihre Funktionen bestimmende 
Überlieferungs—und Rezeptionseigenschaften Rechnung getragen werden 
kann, ist es erst möglich—zum Teil in Anlehnung an die von der Semiotik 
erarbeiteten Begriffe—sie historisch als kommunikativen Prozess, als 
                                                           
31 I am naming these two because Patterson (1987) discusses them in detail; for a 
critical evaluation of the Neo-Exegetical approach to Old English poetry, see Busse 
1984. 
 
32 The fact that literary studies in orality/literacy (which have long abandoned the 
first rigid concepts of Oral-Formulaic Theory) have, up to now, reached anything but an 
overall acceptance in American medieval studies may be deduced from the fact that 
Suzanne Fleischman’s (1990) contribution “Philology, Linguistics, and the Discourse” in 
the Speculum volume dedicated to “New Philology” deals with the Orality/Literacy 
Question mainly from a linguistic point of view. 
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durch identifizierbare Gestaltungs—und Überlieferungsmomente bedingte 
sprachliche Manipulation zu sehen.33 
 
This is a manifesto for the merging of two kinds of approaches developed 
from different historical backgrounds and with different methodological 
claims.34  As is well known, Bäuml put this program into forceful scholarly 
practice with his article on “Varieties and Consequences” a year later.  Here 
he successfully unites the one approach—Jauss’ and Iser’s Reception 
Theory, which was hardly taken note of in America—with the research 
performed in the wake of Milman Parry and Albert Lord—which was, for its 
part, almost totally ignored in Germany.  
 Oral-Formulaic Theory, if we may use this simplifying tag, was or has 
been a “production-oriented” concept just as much as many other 
approaches preceding or contemporary with it. Thus it took some time 
before it was realized that what the Parry/Lord approach had brought to light 
could be unified with anthropological, psychological, and linguistic findings 
that, in their turn, made it obvious that “features of orality” in poetry are not 
only—and sometimes not at all—indications of a compositional technique, 
but rather of cultural states in a very general sense.  Thus the alterity of its 
texts results from encoding that follows different semiotic rules (this is what 
Zumthor’s 1972 Essai de poétique médiévale had brought to the fore). 
Moreover, this difference (and this is the point Zumthor did not yet fully 
grasp in 1972) results in its turn from different anthropological conditions. 
 I cannot delineate here all the findings that have contributed to the 
insight that oral and literate encoding of meaning—and hence also oral and 
                                                           
33 “On the basis of a more precise definition of the notions “oral” and “literate” in 
their respective relation to tradition, composition, text or recital (/performance), audience 
or audience orientation, social function of the types of tradition thus marked, and the like, 
the possibility arises of considering the literature of the Middle Ages as the product of a 
literacy-based culture, sustained by a prevalently illiterate population.  Now, within this 
culture and for the traditional and receptional properties determining their function, we 
are enabled—partly in borrowing from notions developed by semiotics—to see them 
historically as a communicative process, as linguistic manipulation conditioned by 
identifiable elements of form and tradition.” 
 
34 In a similar way Bäuml had advanced those ideas in his essay “Medieval 
Literacy and Illiteracy:  An Essay Toward the Construction of a Model” (1978).  There he 
stated that the “question of perception as determinant of ‘meaning’ is of obvious 
relevance to medieval literature with its parallel oral and written forms of transmission” 
(41). 
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literate decoding of meaning—work very differently.35  In general one may 
say that written communication requires much more extensive linguistic 
planning and explicit manifestation, whereas oral-aural communication may 
rely to a much greater extent on the extra-linguistic context.36  Suffice it to 
quote David Olson’s dictum that in “oral communication the meaning is in 
the context” while in written communication “the meaning is in the text” 
(1977:passim).  Of course we have to concede two things in view of these 
statements. For one thing, Olson’s generalizations are not formulated 
particularly with regard to poetic communication.  Secondly, Olson’s 
considerations are largely historical; that is, he speaks of the historical 
development from orality to literacy.  As to the first point, literary historians 
evidently do not deal with “spontaneous speech,” with discourse that has not 
been planned in advance (even if the “planning” is a matter of traditional 
encoding).  As to the second point, we definitely have to take care not to 
enter the heuristic circle of proving the validity of a theory by applying it to 
the material from which this theory has been abstracted. However, if the 
axiom that the strategies of the encoding (and decoding) of meaning are 
analogous in literary and “non”-literary communications is acceptable, then 
we may, with the necessary precautions, adopt Olson’s observation for our 
investigations into literature. 
 This brings us back to my initial claim that the “discovery” of and 
research into the Orality/Literacy Question (the recognition that something 
is and the simultaneous finding out of what it is [Kuhn 1962]) has much to 
do with “anomalies.” Let us recall: Jauss observed—correctly—that the 
paradigmatic changes in the humanities differ from those in the sciences as 
there are no disturbing “anomalies” in the scientific sense in the humanities, 
since as the latter avail themselves of “no area of empirically verifiable 
observations comparable to that of the [natural] sciences” (“kein der 
Naturwissenschaft vergleichbares Feld empirisch verifizierbarer 
Beobachtungen;” Jauss 1969:54). However, in medieval literary studies 
there are, from the modern point of view, “anomalies,” findings that are, at 
first glance, disconcerting for the modern reader. One such outstanding 
“anomaly” in medieval poetry is its verbal repetitiveness, its 
“formulaicness.” In the established paradigm of literary analyses this 
observation has been relativized and newly aestheticized by claims such as 
                                                           
35 Cf. Schaefer 1992:ch.I.3; there and elsewhere in that book I speak of 
Sinnvermittlung and Sinnermittlung.  The English notions encoding and decoding of 
meaning only imperfectly render the German. 
 
36 Cf. for this from a linguistic point of view Koch and Oesterreicher 1985. 
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Randolph Quirk’s, who postulates with regard to Old English poetry 
(1963:153)  
 
that an expectation of the congruous and complementary, expressed 
through recurrent collocations [= formulae], is built into the poetic system 
of Old English, and it may be supposed that this is close to the starting 
point in estimating the original audience’s pleasureable experience....  
 
This kind of “aesthetic explanation” has obviously been the only one 
available.  
 However, John Foley has recently shown that formulaicness should 
neither be simply regarded as the prime indication for a compositional 
technique nor as some kind of aesthetic “anomaly” of medieval (as well as 
other) poetry. In his recent book Immanent Art (1991) he has, instead, made 
it convincingly clear that the formulaicness of Old English poetry bears 
witness to a specific encoding of meaning—an encoding that he calls 
traditional—that is largely alien to a literate culture and thus requires 
specific semiotic attention.  Moreover, Foley’s book illustrates how Jauss’ 
demand for the “reconstruction of the horizon of expectation” can 
successfully be applied to texts from various times and cultures (such as 
Homeric epic, the epic of the guslari, and the Old English Beowulf) by 
reconstructing—or, in the case of the Balkan epics, observing—this horizon 
with regard to the “pre-understanding of the genre” (here the epic) and 
“from the form and themes of already familiar works” (Jauss 1982a:22).37 
 A line of thought such as Quirk’s, on the other hand, argues away a 
manifest finding—in this case the formulaicness—that is an anomaly within 
our modern literary standards of originality,  by subjugating it to the 
aesthetic pleasure principle and simply (re-)defining what must have been 
pleasurable in that culture.  Now, I am not saying that the formulaicness of 
Old English,  or, for that matter, any other medieval vernacular poetry 
cannot possibly have caused aesthetic pleasure in its audience. My point is 
just that by using such an argument the need to seek any other reasons for 
formulaic diction is suspended if not altogether cancelled. However, on the 
basis of the findings furnished by research into the Orality/Literacy 
Question, we are now in the position to see that poetic linguistic encoding 
may follow rules that are subject not only to historical (secondary) rules of 
aesthetics but also to historical (primary) rules of communication that 
depend on the culture’s situatedness on the scale of the orality/literacy 
                                                           
37 Foley expounds his theoretical orientation on Jauss in chap. 2 of Immanent Art. 
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continuum.38 
 A second case of an “anomaly” consists of those various types of 
vague references that cannot be made out intratextually. Such vague (or even 
totally unintelligible) references range from the opaque use of personal 
pronouns, through the indeterminacy of cause and effect in narrative 
sequence (cf. the Old English Wife’s Lament), and on to “co-textual” 
allusions that forever remain opaque for the modern reader (cf. the 
Finnsburh episode in Beowulf or the mythological references in Deor39). 
 The discovery of the Orality/Literacy Question has furnished us with 
insights for reading such “anomalies” as these as indicative of encoding 
strategies closer to the oral than to the literate mode. Again, this is not to say 
that texts displaying such features are oral in the sense that they are “orally 
composed.”  Given the material circumstances of the (earlier) Middle Ages 
(e.g., no “scrap” paper but wax tablets for sketchy notes), we will at any rate 
have to give up the idea of poets sitting or standing at their desk, “making 
up” their poetry while they write. Yet apart from such “external” conditions, 
what have sometimes been identified as residuals or “traces” of orality (in 
the archeological sense of remainders, or indications that the text in question 
ultimately goes back to times before literacy became available) should rather 
be seen as symptoms of different textual strategies. From the historical point 
of view these anomalies may ultimately be left-overs from (primary) orality.  
But since they appear in texts otherwise indisputably literate, we should 
conceive of these strategies as functioning in their own right. 
 The latter idea seems to point to the necessity that the implicit 
dichotomy in the notion of the “Orality/Literacy Question” that I have 
created here eventually be resolved. I myself have made a step into this 
direction by suggesting for Anglo-Saxon England the term vocality 
(borrowed  from Zumthor 1987) to  denote a cultural situation that very 
much depended and relied on the voice for mediation of verbal 
communication even though writing had already been well established.40 
However, orality and literacy in the sense of “communication in the 
                                                           
38 With the notion of “orality/literacy continuum” I here want to refer to the 
observation that the spectrum from (primary) orality to (fully developed) literacy is a 
wide one with various intermediate stages. 
 
39 A fine analysis of Deor within the (early) framework of Reception Theory has 
been given by Wienold 1972. 
 
40 Cf. Schaefer 1992. 
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oral/aural medium” and “communication in the written/read medium” are 
not just heuristic fictions made up to account for historical phenomena. 
Present-day findings from psychology, anthropology, and—up to now to a 
deplorably small extent—from linguistics show that the strategies of 
encoding and decoding are fundamentally different and that we too avail 
ourselves of the different strategies in different communicative situations 
(for instance, hopefully, in drawing up a lecture or writing an article for 
publication).  Moreover, the cognitive differences between literates and 
illiterates have been extensively investigated and documented.41 Hence, 
unless we share the Derridarian postulate that l’écriture precedes the spoken 
word, a postulate that can only be made on a-phenomenological grounds, the 
dichotomy as well as its translation into a continuum between the “poles” of 
orality and literacy is more than a heuristically convenient concept.42 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 (1) More or less tacitly, all Textwissenschaften have shared the 
assumption that the human faculty for encoding as well as decoding verbal 
communications works in the same way both synchronically and 
diachronically. Lee Patterson’s knowledgeable and forceful discussion of the 
literary medievalists’ attempts to gain adequate hermeneutic access to their 
material shows that the dominant objective has been to make out a “proper” 
(I am not saying “the correct”) understanding of that literature. Yet, while 
New Criticism and Neo-Exegetical Criticism were struggling with such 
“proper” understanding, German Reception Theory had long  passed beyond 
this stage and had thematized the goal of “the understanding of the 
understanding of texts” (“das Ziel des Verstehens des Textverstehens”; 
Gumbrecht 1975:400).  
 This self-imposed task of advanced Reception Theory was, as we 
have seen, a consequence of the specific history of post-war German literary 
studies. Historically speaking, the stage of search for “understanding 
understanding” was skipped in America.  Instead theory-oriented scholars in 
literary studies—and among them also some medievalists—committed 
                                                           
41 Cf. Carothers 1959, Bruner et al. 1966, Lurija 1976. 
 
42 For a discussion of orality/literacy as dichotomy and continuum, cf. Koch and  
Oesterreicher 1985. 
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themselves at once to understanding that “understanding no longer has either 
a basis or a subject” (“Verstehen wird zum Verstehen dessen, dass das 
Verstehen keinen Boden und kein Subjekt mehr hat”;43 Stierle 1990:20) by 
adopting the post-structuralist stance.44 
 (2) As we may observe at present, medieval literary studies in the last 
decade of our century are recalling methodologies and theories, such as 
Philology and Historicism, that have been suspended (up to the point of 
being completely discredited and/or incriminated) by providing them with a 
methodological and theoretical update.  
 If, as Stephen Nichols has stated, it is “manuscript culture that the new 
philology sets out to explore” (1990:7), then Katherine O’Brien O’Keeffe 
has substantially contributed to this exploration with her book Visible Song: 
Transitional Literacy in Old English Verse (1990), at the same time allowing 
the Orality/Literacy Question to provide Philology an impetus toward a new 
paradigm.45 
 If, on the other hand, “New Historicism” is grounded in the 
observation that man “is a creature who is constituted by his own 
constitution of the symbolic activity that is culture,”  as Patterson has 
phrased it (1987:60), then we cannot avoid taking into account the cognitive 
bases  for  this  “symbolic  activity.”   This  is  where  the  integration  of  the  
                                                           
43 Stierle has called the post-structuralist approach an “epistemological 
surrealism” (1990:26); cf. LaCapra’s (early) observation that the “aspects of the work of 
recent French figures (for example Foucault, Deleuze, Sollers, Kristéva, and Derrida) 
[may] be seen in terms of processes of carnivalization” (1982:72); cf. also Hayden White, 
who speaks of the “absurdist moment” of Post-Structuralism (1976/85:269).  There is 
much talk about writing (écriture, s’inscrire, etc.) in Post-Structuralism/Deconstruction.  
However, this notion—if it is a “notion” at all (a doubt that is raised by Deconstruction 
itself since it has a built-in mechanism that coalesces discourse and meta-discourse)—has 
virtually nothing in common with how studies in orality/literacy conceive of writing.  
This point is spelled out by Foley 1991:xiii-xiv. 
 
44 With regard to New Criticism Patterson has remarked (1987:19): “It [i.e., New 
Criticism] privileged . . . secular pluralism over doctrinal conformity, and above all else 
the independence and self-reliance of the individual, who is understood . . . as an 
autonomous being who creates his historical world through his own self-directed efforts.”  
Could it be that Post-Structuralism exactly matched this “pluralism,” this “self-reliance,” 
this “world-creation” through one’s own “self-directed efforts,” by providing a 
superstructure  that  finally sanctioned this pluralism, and so on “theoretically”? 
 
45 For the observation that the Orality/Literacy Question may also be very 
successfully integrated into historical research proper, cf. Vollrath 1981 and 1991. 
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Orality/Literacy Question into Reception Theory contributes to “New 
Historicism,” in that it historizes the semiotics of the encoding and decoding 
processes of this activity. 
 As we medievalists are left only with meaning “as it is encoded,” in 
other words what we usually call “the text,” it appears heuristically logical to 
“historicize” simultaneously (if not in advance) our own activity of 
decoding.  The awareness of differences in this activity has, again, been 
brought about by the Orality/Literacy Question: not only to name the alterity 
of the decoding procedures but also to account for this alterity on both sides 
of the the “categorical epistemological gulf” (Haidu 1974:3b). We are thus 
brought closer to “understanding the understanding” of medieval literature—
and eventually to a more adequate understanding of this literature itself. 
 
Universität Freiburg 
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